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A capitalist economy turns almost everything into a commodity.   It forces people to try to compete in a ‘labour 
market’ in order to earn a living and hence the labour market is of central importance to the life chances of most of the 
population.   Only the very young, the old or incapacitated are spared the usually grueling challenge of ‘competing’ in the 
labour market and it can feel like an inhumane place for those who cannot find a job or enough work. 
In this chapter we argue that Australia’s labour market features too much unemployment, underemployment or 
associated forms of labour market insecurity.   The later term implies a weak or tenuous connection to the labour force 
through underemployment or involuntary casual or part-time work and/or low wages or other manifestations of weakness vis-
à-vis employers.  The direct and indirect costs of such malfunctions in the labour market are reflected in a range of economic, 
social,  health  and  other  costs  (Watts  2000;  Saunders  and Taylor  2002).    Estimates  of  the  costs  of  unemployment  and 
underemployment range from $20 to $40bn per annum in Australia (Watts 2000).  A good deal of social policy is directed to 
problems emanating from the labour market and its various malfunctions.  Accordingly, a good way to minimize the need for 
expensive and often difficult social policy interventions is to try and organize the labour market so that it provides reasonable 
jobs for those that seek them.
Unfortunately, creating such a labour market is not easy.   There are inevitable tensions and conflicts between 
employers and employees over shares of wages and profits.  Also, capitalist economies have rarely created full employment.   
The  so-called  ‘Golden Age’  of  capitalism  in  the  post World War  II  era  was  a  rare  period  of  managed  capitalism,  full 
employment and rising living standards for most.   But employers are wary of full employment because it strengthens the 
bargaining hand of labour, leads to upward pressure on wages and can generate high levels of (wage push) inflation.  It was 3
this scenario that saw the collapse of the Golden Age in the 1970s in Australia and many other capitalist economies.  The 
aftermath, from the 1970s to the early 1990s, was marked by high levels of unemployment and inflation as governments and 
the authorities used policy induced recessions on various occasions to ramp up unemployment in the fight against inflation.   
In this manner, ‘snapping the stick of inflation’ was finally achieved in the early 1990s recession amidst the Reserve Bank of 
Australia’s high interest rate strategy and souring unemployment (Bell 2004).  
Subsequently,  the  long  economic  expansion  (Bell  and  Quiggin  2008)  that  began  with  the  end  of  the  1989-91 
recession and ended with the emergence of a global financial crisis in 2008 yielded a reduction in unemployment from 
around 11 per cent to a little over 4 per cent. This rate, the lowest since the 1970s, was nonetheless high by the standards of 
the full employment economy of the Golden Age.
This chapter begins by looking at the dynamics of the Australian labour market. We argue that the official rate of 4.4 
per cent represents a very conservative estimate of unemployment. The biggest problem in the labour market today is not 
official unemployment but underemployment, sometimes referred to as hidden unemployment.  Based on the assumption that 
more work would reduce the need for expensive social policy interventions, we also examine the various positions in the 
employment policy debate.  
Australia’s Labour Market Dynamics
Typical of wider trends in the advanced economies, the Australian labour market has undergone dramatic changes in 
recent decades.  The structure of employment has changed with a higher premium placed on skills and knowledge.  At the 
lower end of the market, traditional unskilled ‘blue collar’ jobs have been rapidly disappearing, though simultaneously there 
has been a proliferation of part-time and/or casual jobs, especially in the lower paid end of the services sector.  For these and 
other reasons, unemployment, but especially under-employment, insecure forms of work, low wages and rising levels of 
inequality have all become major problems in Australia’s labour market.  
Movements in the official unemployment rate in recent decades are shown in Figure 1.  Although still low by recent 
standards,  the  unemployment  rate  of  4.4  per  cent  as  of  late  2008  still  reflected  the  presence  of  nearly  half  a  million 
Australians  officially  designated  as  being  unemployed.  Indeed,  the  number  of  dependent  children  living  in  ‘no  job’ 
households stands at around 16 per cent or almost 1 in 6 of all households (Argy 2005: 78).  
Figure 1
A major driver of unemployment has been the size of the gap between labour force growth and employment levels, 
especially the large gaps opened up in each of the major recessions during the 1970s and in the early 1980s and early 1990s.   
These recessions - as periods of intense job destruction - have a devastating impact on employment growth and are a major 
factor in driving up unemployment and embedding high levels of long-term unemployment.
The method of measuring unemployment used by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) (and other statistical 3
agencies in many other countries) is highly restrictive and does not include many people who would generally be regarded as 
unemployed.  One hour of paid employment in the relevant survey reference week, for example, is sufficient for a person to 
be classified as employed.   In addition, people who are not actively looking for work, or are not ready to start work 
immediately, are classified as ‘not in the labour force’. The implication, as Lee and Miller (2000: 76) suggest, is that ‘the 
official unemployment rate is not reflective of the true state of the labour market’.  
Langmore and Quiggin (1994) consider a range of forms of unemployment not included in the official headline 
measure of unemployment. First, there are ‘discouraged workers’, or persons who have given up trying to find work, either 
because of poor job readiness of because of disillusionment or other reasons related to not being able to find work.   In 
September 2007, the ABS estimated that there were about 76,000 discouraged workers in Australia.
Second, there are ‘underemployed workers’ – those working part-time who would like more hours of work or who 
would perhaps like to work full time.  In late 2007 about one in four part-time workers stated they would like to work longer 
hours (Campbell 2008: 165).  The proportion of part-time workers in the workforce has grown from around 6 per cent in the 
1960s to over 30 per cent today.  Australia has one of the highest rates of part-time work in the advanced OECD economies.   
As the official unemployment rate has declined in recent years, the number of underemployed workers has continued to grow 
substantially.  Campbell (2008: 157) points out that the underemployment rate has tripled in recent decades and now stands at 
over 6 per cent of the labour force, or almost 680,000 workers.
Third, there are people of working age who have left the labour force and gone on to disability benefits, or taken 
early access to the old age pension. Some recipients of disability benefits are completely incapacitated for work. However, 
many people with minor disabilities who would be employable in a properly functioning labour market have ended up on 
disability benefits. Given that the health status of the population has generally been improving, the large increase in the 
number of people receiving disability benefits can only be regarded as a form of disguised unemployment.  Similarly, it is 
often difficult to distinguish between voluntary and involuntary early retirement. Nevertheless, a reduction in workforce 
participation for workers aged over 50 makes little economic sense in a context where the proportion of the population in this 
age group can be expected to increase steadily.
In a review of these forms of labour under-utilisation, Argy (2005: 77) estimated that around 900,000 people or 
about  9  per  cent  of  the  labour  force  were  affected  by  these  forms  of  underemployment  or  ‘hidden  unemployment’.   
Considering these issues, Wooden (1996) estimates that the official category of ‘unemployment’ captures only about half of 
the true level of labour under-utilisation (see also Mitchell 2001, Mitchell and Watts 1997, Mitchell and Carlson 2001).
Unemployment  and  under-employment  thus  remain  major  challenges  in  Australia.    A  series  of  reviews  of  the 
performance of the labour market (Bell 2002, Argy 2005, and Campbell 2008) also show that:
• After  years  of  sustained  economic  growth  in  the  long  economic  expansion  (that  now  appears  to  have  ended), 
cyclical forms of unemployment stemming from weak demand in the economy were substantially diminished.  In 
2005, Argy  (2005:  80)  calculated  that  about  1  per  cent  of  the  workforce  was  afflicted  by  cyclical  sources  of 
unemployment  and  underemployment.    More  serious  are  ‘structural’  sources  of  unemployment  and  under 3
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employment, which Argy calculated as affecting at least 5 per cent of the labour force, with ‘frictional’ sources 
(unemployment  between  jobs)  affecting  a  further  two  per  cent  of  the  labour  force.    Structural  sources  of 
unemployment  stem  from  various  kinds  of  labour  market  mismatches  and  rigidities,  particularly  mismatches 
between the skills workers may have and the skill requirements of the jobs on offer.   Many unskilled or older 
displaced workers are in this category.
• Partly because of such structural factors there has been a steep rise in the level of long-term unemployment, with the 
duration of unemployment roughly doubling since the late 1970s.  This is one of the key and apparently enduring 
‘scarring’  effects  of  major  recessions  and  periods  of  high  unemployment.    At  present  almost  a  third  of  the 
unemployed have been unemployed for more than a year and are officially classified as long term unemployed. 
• Although declining somewhat in the 1990s, the employment/GDP ratios across the advanced economies (including 
Australia) have been relatively strong since the 1970s.   Although there has been ‘jobless growth’ in a number of 
sectors (mining, agriculture and manufacturing), this has not been the case in aggregate terms.   Nevertheless, the 
growth of employment and the relatively strong jobs intensity of output growth since the 1970s have not kept pace 
with the demand for jobs.  Persistent unemployment reflects the failure of the labour market to create enough jobs to 
satisfy demand.  Indeed, the unemployed persons/job vacancy ratio has averaged around 11:1 since the early 1970s 
(Mitchell  2001:  17). Whilst  unemployment  was  once  relatively  evenly  distributed,  there  is  now  a  strong  trend 
towards jobs rich and jobs poor households, neighborhoods and regions (Gregory and Hunter 1996).  
• In the long expansion, many labour market ‘insiders’ did well in terms of growth in skilled employment and higher 
wages.   However, there were also many labour market fringe dwellers in low paid and insecure forms of work, 
whilst many labour market ‘outsiders’ languish in unemployment or, as outlined above, in severe underemployment.   
It should also be noted that partly due to wage disciplining policies (such as earlier policy induced recessions), 
structural change in the labour market, and a strengthening in the hand of employers in wage bargaining, aggregate 
wages growth has slowed substantially.  The result of these changes has meant that the recent long expansion did not 
see a return of rapid wages growth of the kind that had previously fuelled inflation.  This is a major turn around. 
Over the fourteen years to the middle of 2005, labour costs increased only 27 per cent, compared to 144 per cent 
over the fourteen years prior to this (Edwards 2006: 72).
• The employment rate for women has increased substantially in recent decades, and the labour market status of 
women has in this respect improved relative to that of men. In the 1970s, males had about half the unemployment 
rate of females.  Now males have higher unemployment rates than females.  Indeed, male full-time employment in 
the age range 45-54 has fallen by 16 per cent since 1970 and by 32 per cent over the same period in the 55-64 age 
range (Keating 2004: 115).  Youth and the less skilled also suffer relatively high levels of unemployment.  
• The most systematic observation across the various trends is that unemployment is overwhelmingly a problem for 
low skilled male workers facing the effects of structural change in industries or regions that are shedding labour.  A 
particular hotspot in this regard has been labour shedding in the manufacturing sector (Gregory and Hunter 1996).   
Unemployment levels for such male workers would have been even more acute had there not been a substantial 5
decline in male full-time labour market participation rates.  
• Much of the employment created in the expansion consisted of part-time and/or casual jobs.  It is also the case that a 
significant proportion of new jobs are relatively insecure and poorly paid, while a smaller number of high-income, 
high-status jobs have been created. This partly reflects structural change in the economy and employer strategy.   
Full-time  employment  losses  in  the  manufacturing  and  public  sectors  have  in  many  cases  been  replaced  by 
employment in the low-end market services sector.   Other contributors include rapid changes in the structure of 
demand, changing product cycles and heightened competitive pressures with a greater emphasis on bottom line 
returns leading employers to abandon assumptions about durable employment patterns in favour of downsizing and 
greater ‘flexibility’.   The net effect is far higher levels of labour ‘churning’ and an associated rise in frictional 
unemployment, in some cases blending into long term unemployment (Hancock 1999).  Part-time employment has, 
at least initially, borne the brunt of the contraction in employment associated with the current downturn.
• There has been a major expansion of ‘non-standard’ forms of work in Australia, particularly, as noted above, casual 
and part-time work, typically with reduced levels of job security.  Sheehan  (1998: 241) argues that since 1973, 1 in 
5 full-time jobs have been lost in the economy.  Put another way, 'if the 1973 ratio of full-time employment to the 
population of working age had been maintained through to 1996, the number of full-time jobs available in the 
Australian economy would have been about 2.8 million higher than was actually the case'.  Campbell (2000) shows 
that between 1990 and 1999, 71 per cent of the growth of employment was accounted for by the growth of casual 
employment.  Over the same decade, the proportion of full-time, permanent employees in the labour force declined 
from 73.5 per cent to 63.4 per cent.   As Campbell (2000: 70) argues, ‘At the level of the workforce as a whole, 
casual employment appears to be slowly replacing full-time permanent employment’.  Male full-time employment 
increased by only 5 per cent in the thirteen years between 1989 and 2002 (Keating 2004: 115).
• Income inequality is increasing (Borland 1999, Argy 2003).  Significant areas of jobs growth in the services sector 
(including accommodation and cafes, retail and wholesale trade and personal and other services) pay at or below 
average  weekly  wages.    This  expansion  of  low  wage  services  employment  in  Australia,  combined  with 
unemployment and less equal access to work, has produced a marked shift towards a more inegalitarian distribution 
of incomes.  For example, the earnings of male full time workers in the lowest income decile fell from 76 per cent of 
median earnings in 1975 to 65 per cent in 2000, whilst the corresponding fall for females was from 80 to 71 per cent 
(Keating 2004: 114).  
Policy Responses
A number of major public policy issues are raised by the labour market dynamics outlined above.  One issue is what 
to do about unemployment and underemployment?  A second issue is how to address the problem of increasing inequality 
born of unemployment, underemployment and structural change in the labour market?  A third related issue pertains to the 
role of social policy and the welfare state. Finally, there is the question of how to minimise unemployment arising from the 5
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end of the long expansion.
In terms of unemployment and under-employment, these stem from the failure of the economy to create sufficient 
jobs, or the right kinds of jobs, to meet the demands for work.   The policy debate on how best to create more jobs has 
traditionally been polarized between neoliberal ‘supply-side’ arguments and Keynesian-inspired ‘demand-side’ arguments.  
That there are such different views on how to ‘construct’ the problem of unemployment points to the fact that social 
reality is always wide open to differing interpretations (Blyth 2004).   In this case the differences hinge on competing 
paradigms (Keynesian vs. neoclassical) within the discipline of economics.  The debate between these paradigms has been 
waged for decades.  In the postwar Golden Age era, Keynesian interpretations were dominant.  Since the 1970s, for a range of 
reasons (including shifts in the dominant political coalition) neoclassical cum neoliberal views have been ascendant.   The 
technical debate on these issues is typically waged by labour market economists and other experts, but as always in politics, 
the arguments and messages are massaged and propagated by various players including interest groups, think tanks, political 
parties, trade unions, employers, bureaucrats, central bankers and governments.   We will return to the dilemmas facing 
governments in a moment, but first we need to unpack this aspect of the policy debate.
Supply-siders see unemployment mainly as an individualized problem of labour supply.  In other words, those who 
are unemployed are (market) ‘deficient’ in some way: including laziness, education or skill deficiencies, an unwillingness to 
move to where jobs are on offer, asking for 'excessive' wages etc.  The cure for such problems, according to supply-siders, is 
a dose of 'microeconomic reform' of the labour market designed to reduce structural rigidities and increase labour skills and 
'flexibility'.    This  might  include  efforts  to  force  people  off  the  dole  to  search  harder  for  work,  education  and  skills 
enhancement, labour market programs (eg. re-location subsidies, job placement services etc) and/or efforts to reduce wages, 
or the availability of dole payments.  
Such approaches offer the prospect of reducing at least some of the labour market mismatches noted above and thus 
some of the structural sources of unemployment.  However, education, skills enhancement and other labour market policies 
on the supply-side are no panacea. Education, job training, re-location subsidies, or job placement services may help some 
workers gain a job currently on offer.   Indeed, such an approach may help alleviate some of the current areas of labour 
shortage.   On the other hand, some of the structural mismatches can be entrenched, particularly at the bottom end of the 
labour  market.    In  this  respect,  consideration  also  needs  to  be  given  to  the  little  debated  possibility  that  the  level  of 
commitment,  intellect  and  knowledge  required  to  successfully  participate  in  today’s  labour  market  may  be  increasingly 
beyond the capacity of many.   As the American writer, Larry Letich (1995) has argued: 'It is possible that over the last 100 
years, and especially the last 40, we may have created a society that demands more brain power than many people are able to 
give'.  If so, even an advanced 'training augmented' labour market will fail the key distributional tasks of providing jobs and 
adequate incomes for many of those at the bottom.   In this situation, the only solution is to explicitly supply jobs with 
reasonable wages that match feasible capabilities and talents. This is an explicitly distributional or welfare issue which in an 
increasingly knowledge based economy the market is not solving.
Nor  will  supply-side  measures  by  themselves  create  new  jobs.    In  a  study  of  the  relationship  between  skills 
upgrading and unemployment, Chapman's (1999) 'major conclusion is that the answer to Australian job creation, at least in 7
the short to medium term, does not lie in increasing the skills of the unemployed'.  Nor will supply-side upgrading necessarily 
create jobs that are suited to the needs or capacities of the unemployed or underemployed.  
It is also important to note that the neoliberal view that reducing wages will help price workers into jobs and thus 
help ‘clear’ the market is based on a simple demand and supply view of the world: if something is cheaper (in this case 
labour) more will be demanded.   Because unemployment is currently most pronounced amongst low skill workers, the 
advocates of such wage cutting strategies often argue for wages cuts for low skilled jobs.  This view has been endorsed by the 
former Governor of the Reserve Bank, Ian Macfarlane.  In a speech in 1997, he cited the situation in the larger continental 
European  economies,  where  labour  markets  have  an  institutional  framework  which  promotes  'jobs  security,  imposes 
relatively strict minimum wages and conditions, provides easily accessible sickness benefits and unemployment benefits, and 
increases trade union involvement'.  These, Macfarlane argues, 'work against the interests of job creation' (Macfarlane 1997: 
6).  The  solution  Macfarlane  advocates  is  further  movement  towards  US,  UK  and  New  Zealand  style  labour  market 
deregulation.   This, Macfarlane concedes, will reduce wages and conditions for some workers and lead to growing wage 
dispersion and inequality, but it is a price we must pay, he argues.  On the question of fairness, he states that 'while income 
inequality may not seem very fair, unemployment is not very fair either' (Macfarlane 1997: 6).  Some economists call this the 
'diabolical trade-off'.   
The  problem  with  this  approach  is  that  it  is  not  at  all  clear  that  wage  cuts  actually  create  much  employment 
(Junankar 2000).   If anything, labour markets have become more flexible in the last two decades yet unemployment and 
underemployment continue to be major problems (Standing 1997).   Also, a wage moderation or wage cutting approach to 
unemployment is not likely to prove to be electorally popular, so governments have not been keen to openly advocate such a 
policy stance.  Instead, governments have tended to adopt various kinds of labour market ‘flexibility’ approaches, including 
strengthening the hand of employers in wage bargaining under moves towards ‘enterprise bargaining’.  Such moves have not 
lead to a substantial widening of wage relativities (Keating 2004: 67-68), although flexibility has increased in terms of 
working hours and how work is organized.   Governments have also worked to make the dole less attractive and various 
schemes involving skills training and other labour market programs have also been adopted.   In Australia, however, these 
latter programs have tended to be rather poorly funded and ad hoc.  The constant churning of people through such programs, 
often with limited results in terms of employment, has lead to much frustration on the part of those forced through such 
programs.     As  a  former  senior  public  servant  has  argued,  unless  there  are  more  jobs  and  better  training  and  skills 
enhancement: ‘the present government’s policy of requiring unemployed persons to pursue non-existent jobs will continue to 
be both impractical and morally bankrupt’ (Keating 2004: 120).
Demand-siders, by contrast, recognize structural unemployment and supply-side problems, but place more emphasis 
in explaining unemployment on the demand-side of the economy.   Demand-side analysts tend to draw on the Keynesian 
paradigm and are more skeptical than supply-siders regarding the ability of unfettered markets to generate full employment.   
As Mitchell (2002) argues, the main factors that have driven unemployment in the last two decades are weak aggregate 
demand and inadequate levels of growth, particularly during major recessions. Consequently, demand-side analysts argue that 
strong  economic  growth  and  above  all  the  avoidance  of  recessions  are  central  in  dealing  with  unemployment  and 
underemployment.  Demand-siders often have a more positive view of government than supply-siders (cum neoliberals) and 
they argue that government can play a role in stimulating economic growth: for example, through the careful use of fiscal 7
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policy (ie. taxing and spending powers) to help stimulate the economy when needed (Nevile 2000).  
Since the last recession Australia has until recently experienced a sustained expansion, due in part to the judicious 
use of monetary policy and a greater willingness on the part of policy makers to avoid recessions (Bell and Quiggin 2008).   
The use of such stimulatory fiscal and monetary policy is certainly evident at present as governments around the world 
struggle to limit the current major downturn. However, such expansionary policy may eventually run into limits in terms of 
current account problems or especially higher inflation.  
The practical difficulties of pursuing a strong dose of either a supply or demand side approach to unemployment and 
underemployment has meant that governments have often adopted limited versions of each approach and have tended to 
muddle along on a middle path. Economic growth helped reduce unemployment and such a trend was accompanied by the 
kinds of supply-side and labour market ‘flexibility’ policies noted above. Even during the expansion, unemployment was 
slow in coming down and a range of other adverse labour market trends noted above were apparent.  However, the realization 
by governments that adverse labour market trends did not seem to be biting politically, saw the unemployment issue shelved 
during the long expansion
A significant slowdown or recession, which now (late 2008) seems likely, will bring labour market issues and 
unemployment into stark relief.  The most plausible response is a targeted approach to job creation, mainly through publicly 
funded public and community sector jobs creation aimed at matching jobs to available skill and worker mobility capacities 
(Langmore and Quiggin 1994, Bell 2000; Quiggin 2000). Direct jobs creation might also aim to supply low skilled jobs for 
those that require them.  Ultimately, a much more substantial policy response in terms of education and training (in order to 
better match skills to available jobs) and to promote targeted public sector job creation are required.  
By contrast, Australian governments have taken the issue of rising market inequality more seriously.  Traditional tax 
and spend social policy and welfare state interventions have had a major effect in treating at least the symptoms of many of 
the labour market trends outlined above, especially in ameliorating wages inequality.   Indeed, thus far, the effects of the 
labour market dynamics outlined above in driving inequality have largely been offset by governments using taxation, cash 
payments and the provision of services.  In other words, although private market income inequality has increased, the total 
disposable and final incomes available to households have not shown a marked trend towards greater inequality, largely 
because of various measures taken by government.  For example, twenty five years ago low income households in Australia 
received little in the way of direct income transfers.  Today, low income families with dependent children and living in rental 
accommodation might receive almost half of their disposable income from government transfers (Keating 2004: 116).  These 
days almost one third of all Australian adult residents now receive some form government income support.
Prospects and Future Directions?
Beyond the problems and responses outlined above, another large medium-term labour market issue confronting 
Australia stems from demographic dynamics.  In the period, 1978-1998, annual labour force growth averaged 1.9 per cent, 
but from 1998-2016, the ABS estimates that this growth rate will average only half the former rate, with labour force growth 
of only 0.8 per cent annually.  Indeed, both labour force growth and the labour force participation rate are expected to decline 9
substantially, due to a slower rate of population growth and an ageing population.   Independent of any other shift, these 
changes should help bring down unemployment and could well lead to future widespread labour shortages.   No doubt, 
targeted immigration programs will continue to play a role in partly dealing with Australia’s labour requirements, but labour 
shortages  across  many  of  the  advanced  economies  (or  at  least  those  with  slow  labour  force  growth)  will  intensify 
international competition for skilled, mobile labour.  In a context in which many of the best paid and most rewarding jobs 
require high skills, and where economic growth is increasingly related to the skills and talents of the workforce, Australia will 
need to try and lift the education and skills of the labour force.  
Conclusion
If we agree that good jobs and reasonable pay are absolutely central to people’s life chances in a capitalist economy, 
then the labour market challenges outlined above pose some serious problems.   At present labour market disadvantage, 
unemployment, under employment and market inequality loom large.  Many Australians (particularly those without skills or 
those suffering other forms of labour market disadvantage) will remain unemployed, under employed or on low incomes.  
These challenges will confront employment, labour market and social policy makers with major conceptual and 
administrative problems.  In recent years there have been calls that older forms of statist and top down policy making in these 
areas should be devolved down into more participatory forms of decision making in neighbourhoods, communities and 
regions.  In short, the view here is that the state should ‘enable’ rather than direct (Botsman and Latham 2001; Smyth and 
Wearing 2002).  Similarly, some argue that the welfare state was never designed for long term support for the unemployed or 
disadvantaged and that older welfare state models now foster passive welfare dependency.  The new emphasise is now on 
welfare to work programs and ‘mutual obligation’ (Considine 2002).  Whilst laudable in some respects, many of the agendas 
and  programs  say  too  little  about  the  actual  creation  of  jobs.   At  their  worst  they  descend  into  born-again  forms  of 
communitarianism, or mercilessly prod the unemployed and disadvantaged through workfare programs with insufficient jobs 
in sight at the end. 
A  further  issue  that  needs  to  be  confronted  is  that  effectively  dealing  with  unemployment,  underemployment, 
inequality and education and skills upgrading will be expensive.  The net costs of the required programs and initiatives (given 
the various returns and spin offs) are likely to much lower than the gross costs.  However, the next several decades contain a 
fiscal time bomb stemming from the likely costs of an ageing population, more expensive health care, education and skill 
enhancement, public infrastructure investment, protection of the environment and other non-insignificant new expenditures.   
Keating (2004: 148) estimates that new public expenditure requirements will amount to an additional 10 per cent of GDP.  If 
we add new and continuing costs of dealing with labour market disadvantage and social and economic inequality, this 
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Figure 1
Unemployment in Australia, 1960-2004
Source ABS Cat. Nos. 6202.0; 6203.0, 6204.0
    
    
    
    
    
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
                                       13
Table 1
Persons in and not in the Labour Force
Source: ABS 6220.0